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Abstract: A  m a n u f a c t u r e r  l e a r n s  a  p r o d u c t ’ s  r i s k s  a f t e r  i t  h a s  b e e n  s o l d  a n d  
distributed to consumers.  When held strictly liable for product-related injuries, 
the  manufacturer  offers  to  repurchase  the  product  when  the  risk  exceeds  a 
threshold.    Consumers  accept  the  offer  when  their  private  valuations  of 
consumption  are  smaller  than  the  buyback  price.    The  manufacturer’s  private 
incentives to stage a buyback are insufficient, the buyback price offered is too 
low, and the continued product usage by consumers is excessive.  The ability of 
the manufacturer to repurchase the product ex post reduces the incentive to design 
safer  products  ex  ante.    A  negligence  rule,  the  “post-sale  duty  to  warn,” 
implements the social welfare benchmark. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the summer of 2000, Williams-Sonoma learned that the small propane gas grills that 
they  had  been  selling  through  their  stores,  their  catalog,  and  the  internet  were  defective.
2  
Although no injuries had occurred, two customers reported that they had been unable to turn off 
the flow of the propane gas, suggesting a serious risk of a fire or an explosion.  Using its own 
electronic credit card records and enlisting the help of credit card companies, Williams-Sonoma 
contacted the nearly 1000 customers who had purchased the grill, offering a full refund of the 
$200 purchase price plus a $50 gift certificate.
3  All but two of the grills were returned and 
Williams-Sonoma was publicly lauded for their fast and effective response.
4  
Product recalls have become increasingly common in recent years.  In the United States 
in 2002, one in eleven cars on the road were recalled, a total of almost 19 million automobiles. In 
2003,  there  were  more  than  5,000  consumer  products  recalled  involving  approximately  60 
million consumer purchases.
5  The recall process is overseen by six government agencies: the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Department of Agriculture, 
the Coast Guard, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).    While many of the recalls 
                                                 
2   Williams-Sonoma, Inc. is a specialty retailer in the United States.  Williams-Sonoma began in 
1956 by importing high-quality pots and pans from France.  More recently, they have expanded 
to selling small electric appliances, tableware, cookbooks, and specialty foods. 
3  See Finley (2002a), Consumer Reports (2004), and the Federal Document Clearing House 
(2001).  They also offered to reimburse shipping charges and to pick up the grills from the 
customers’ homes.  M2 Presswire (2000). 
4   Similarly, in 2005 Starbuck’s coffee offered a full refund and a $5 gift certificate for the return 
of certain tea kettles that could cause harm to consumers.  See Parkin (2006).  The example of 
the  BernzOMatic  Company  stands  in  contrast  to  these  success  stories.    The  BernzOMatic 
Company initiated a recall of their low-budget gas heaters in 1987.  Tragically, almost forty 
people had already died from its carbon monoxide emissions.   Despite offering $250 for the 
return of the heaters that originally were sold for just $35, it is estimated that over 7,000 of the 
40,000 heaters sold still remain in household use.  See Finley (2002a). 
5    See Consumer Reports (2004).  Most of these products remain in use and unfixed.  It is 
estimated that one third of all vehicles subject to recalls are never fixed, and the number of the 
unrepaired toys, appliances, electronics and car seats is far higher. 
  2instruct consumers to discontinue their use of the product and return it to the retailer or the 
manufacturer for a refund or a repair, the policies vary.  Some recalls are simply warnings to 
consumers to limit their use of products.
6 Others supplement their warnings with recommended 
consumer actions, such as removing or disabling a hazardous part of the product.
7
This paper considers the problem faced by a manufacturer who learns the propensity of a 
product to harm consumers only after the product has been sold and distributed to customers.   In 
the post-sale stage, the privately-informed manufacturer must decide whether to contact previous 
customers to warn them of the impending risks and whether to solicit the return of the product. 
Recalls are costly, however – contacting consumers and repurchasing the product only makes 
financial sense when the benefits are large.
8  This paper considers the effect of strict liability on 
the manufacturer’s post-sale decision to recall the product from the market and on the ex ante 
incentive to design safer products to begin with.  A negligence-based rule, the “post-sale duty to 
warn,” is also considered. 
New information about the risks posed by previously-sold products is socially valuable 
because of its potential to change consumer behavior.  Suppose the previously-sold product is 
discovered to be more dangerous than originally expected.  In this case, some consumers who 
might otherwise have continued to use the product (based upon the prior beliefs) should in fact 
discontinue their use.
9  On the flip side, if the product is discovered to be unusually safe – much 
safer than expected – then some consumers who might otherwise have stopped using the product 
should resume using it.  In general, the socially optimal policy features disclosure of product 
risks at the two extremes: when the product is especially dangerous and when the product is 
unusually safe.  Assuming that the expected product risk is fairly small to begin with, and that 
the  bulk  of  consumers  derive  sufficient  value  from  using  the  product,  allows  us  to  restrict 
attention  to  the  former  case.    This  generates  a  realistic  social  welfare  benchmark  where 
                                                 
6  See, for example, “CPSC Warns of Choking Hazard from Halloween Pumpkin Erasers,” CPSC 
Release # 95-018.   
7 S e e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  “ B a b y  C o o k i e  M o n s t e r  T oys  Sold  with  DVD  at  Wal-Mart  Recalled  for 
Choking Hazard,” CPSC Release #07-009. 
8  In the words Marty Richmond, the spokesman of Furniture Brands International, the parent 
company of Lane and Broyhill among others, "Simply getting the consumer to recognize the 
threat and making them pick up the phone is hands down the most difficult." Finley (2002b). 
9  If the product is extremely dangerous – causing death with certainty for example – then the 
product should be totally withdrawn from the market.  More generally, however, consumers with 
sufficiently high valuations for the product are in a position to bear increased levels of risk. 
  3consumers  are  warned  when  (and  only  when)  the  product  is  discovered  to  be  particularly 
hazardous and stop using the product when the risks exceed the private benefit of continued use.  
Manufacturer liability for consumer harms is socially valuable in this setting.  Without it, 
the  manufacturer  would  have  no  ex  post i n c e n t i v e  t o  w a r n  c o n s u m e r s  o r  t o  r e p u r c h a s e  t h e  
product.  Consumers would continue to use hazardous products and would suffer the harms.  
Under strict liability, the manufacturer has an incentive to withdraw hazardous products from the 
market.  The manufacturer privately benefits from a buyback when the price that it pays to 
repurchase a unit is smaller than the expected future liability associated with that unit.
10  Strict 
liability does not achieve the social welfare benchmark for two reasons, however.  First, the 
manufacturer is a monopsonist in the post-sale stage and will therefore exercise market power, 
offering a buyback price that is below the opportunity cost (the expected harm to a consumer).  
Since the buyback price that the manufacturer offers is too low, the continued product use is 
excessive.
11  Second, the manufacturer will not sink the fixed costs to initiate a recall often 
enough.  Intuitively, consumers with low valuations for the product receive consumer surplus 
from a recall (since their valuations for continued product use are below the buyback price).  The 
manufacturer only considers his own profit when contemplating a buyback, not the consumer 
surplus associated with a buyback. 
A negligence-based duty to warn that holds the manufacturer responsible for consumer 
harms if and only if the manufacturer failed to issue a cost-justified warning achieves the social 
welfare benchmark.  Indeed, this rule is consistent with the 1998 Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability §10, which imposes a post-sale duty to warn when “a reasonable person in the 
seller’s position would provide such a warning.”  Before the Restatement was published by the 
                                                 
10  This rule is a variant of the familiar rule of strict liability with no defense of contributory 
negligence.  The decision of a consumer to continue to use the product in our setting is analogous 
to consumer care to avoid accidents in the more traditional setting.  A defense of contributory 
negligence in our model would shift liability to the consumer if the consumer continued to use 
the product despite having a low private valuation for consumption.  In practice, a consumer’s 
utility for consumption is private information so such a rule would be very hard for a court to 
enforce. For this reason, the rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is not 
formally considered here. 
11  We maintain the assumption throughout the paper that the manufacturer cannot commit to a 
buyback  price  ahead  of  time.    This  is  a  reasonable assumption when the complexity of the 
product  precludes  an  accurate  ex  ante f o r e c a s t  o f  a l l  o f  t h e  r i sks  that  might  arise  and  the 
propensity for harm. 
  4American Law Institute in 1998, it was uncommon for courts to recognize the post-sale duties of 
sellers.  Since then, however, more than 30 states have adopted some version of it.
12  To apply 
this rule, the court would need to assess whether “the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify 
the burden of providing a warning.”
13  To do this accurately, the court would need to understand 
not only the product risks, but also the nature of consumer demand and the costs of contacting 
consumers and communicating the information effectively.  These are heroic assumptions.  In 
contrast, strict liability only requires the court to observe the ex post realizations of harms. 
We also extend the basic model to include ex ante investments by the manufacturer to 
improve product safety, investments that are assumed to be easily observed by consumers at the 
time of a sale.  When there is no manufacturer liability – so consumers bear all future accident 
losses ex post – the manufacturer has an especially strong ex ante incentive to invest in product 
safety.  Consumers, knowing that they won’t be warned of impending harms in the future, are 
willing to pay a large premium for safer products ex ante.  The ex ante safer design of a product 
effectively serves as a substitute for ex post product recalls.  The manufacturer’s incentive to 
invest in product safety is lower under strict liability.  Intuitively, the manufacturer’s ability to 
mitigate the harms of unsafe products through future product buybacks reduces the marginal 
benefit of safety investments ex ante.  The manufacturer’s incentive to invest in product safety is 
lower still under the post-sale duty to warn.  Consumers, knowing that they have the chance to 
mitigate harms in the future after a warning is issued, demand less safety ex ante. Nevertheless, 
the post sale duty to warn creates the highest social value, followed by strict liability, which is 
followed by no manufacturer liability at all. 
There is a sizable empirical literature on product recalls.  Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) 
conduct an events study of the pharmaceutical and automobile industries, looking at the reaction 
of the stock market to recall announcements.  They show that the stock price reaction is much 
                                                 
12 See the report by the American Bar Association, Ross (2004). 
13 Subsection (b) of the Restatement provides:  “A reasonable person in the seller's position 
would provide a warning after the time of sale if: (1) the seller knows or reasonably should know 
that the product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and (2) those to whom a 
warning might be provided can be identified and can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the 
risk of harm; and (3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those to 
whom a warning might be provided; and (4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the 
burden of providing a warning.” 
 
  5greater, in magnitude, than the direct costs of the recall.
14  Rupp and Taylor (2002) explore 
empirically why some automobile recalls are initiated by the automobile manufacturer while 
others  are  initiated  by  the  NHTSA.    In  practice,  about  80%  of  automobile  recalls  are 
manufacturer-initiated,  while  only  20%  are  government-initiated.    They  show  that  the 
manufacturer is more likely to initiate the less expensive recalls, while the government is more 
likely to initiate larger recalls.
15   
There is also a small theoretical literature on product recalls.  Marino (1997) considers 
the design of involuntary recall procedures.  In his model, the liability system is imperfect and, in 
the absence of regulatory involvement, the incentives of manufacturers to design safer products 
would be suboptimal.  The threat of an audit, and the impending punishment of an involuntary 
recall, gives the manufacturer the incentive to design safer products ex ante.
16  Marino does not 
consider  information  disclosure,  buybacks,  or  the  post-sale  incentives  of  manufacturers  or 
consumers.  Welling (1991) does consider the incentives of manufacturers to voluntarily recall 
products and warn consumers about product risks.  In her model, firms are long-lived and have 
an incentive to develop reputations for being honest with consumers.  Disclosing product defects 
can  boost  consumer  confidence  and  stimulate  higher  future  sales.  She  does  not,  however, 
consider product buybacks or the post-sale duties to warn that are considered here.
17   
Ben-Shahar (2005) investigates the incentives of a manufacturer to continue selling a 
dangerous  product  when  consumers  are  unsuspecting  of  the  harms  that  they  face.    The 
manufacturer’s  decision  to  stop  selling  the  product  serves  as  an  admission  of  guilt  making 
victims more likely to sue.  When faced with strict liability, manufacturers will keep dangerous 
products on the market too long to avoid stimulating a flood of lawsuits that wouldn’t otherwise 
                                                 
14 Interestingly, rivals’ stock prices were also negatively affected by the recalls, suggesting an 
industry-wide reduction in demand.  But see the critique of Hoffer et. al. (1988). 
15 Hoffer et. al. (1994) show that owners of newer domestic models are more likely to respond to 
an automobile recall, bringing their cars in for repairs, than owners of older foreign models.  
Hartman (1987) shows that automobile recalls lead the resale prices of the affected models to 
fall, while the resale prices of other models were unaffected. While not about recalls, Mathios 
(2000) explores the impact of disclosure laws on salad dressing sales. 
16 Marino shows that the second-best regulatory mechanism hinges on the degree of competition 
in the industry and on the efficacy of the liability system. 
17  W e l l i n g  s h o w s  t h a t  i m p o s i n g  s t rict  liability  on  manufacturers  when  they  fail  to  warn 
consumers (but not otherwise) implements the social optimum when consumers all face the same 
level of risk.  In our model, strict liability with a warning defense leads to excessive disclosure. 
  6occur.
18  B e n - S h a h a r  d o e s n ’ t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  b e h a vior  of  existing  consumers  under  different 
liability rules, however, nor does he consider the efficacy of other post-sale actions such as 
product buybacks.
19
Shavell  (1994)  and  Polinsky  and  Shavell  (2006)  consider  the  costly  acquisition  and 
subsequent  disclosure  of  information  about  product  safety  by  monopolists  prior  to  a  sale.
20  
Manufacturers have a private incentive to disclose favorable information, since higher quality 
products  command  higher  prices  in  the  market.
21  M a n u f a c t u r e r s  w h o  l e a r n  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  
relatively unsafe products refrain from disclosing and, in equilibrium, pool with manufacturers 
who  chose  not  to  acquire  the  information  at  all.    In  contrast,  the  current  paper  considers 
information that is discovered after a sale has taken place and the impact that liability rules have 
on the decision to recall products.   
Section 2 presents the basics of the model.  Section 3 ch aracterizes a social welfare 
benchmark.  Section 4 analyzes decentralized ex post market behavior under three regimes: no 
manufacturer liability, strict manufacturer liability, and the post-sale duty to warn.  Section 5 
extends  the  basic  framework  to  include  ex  ante i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  p r o d u c t  s a f e t y .   S e c t i o n  6  
concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
                                                 
18  The manufacturer also has socially inadequate incentives to acquire information about product 
risks.  Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence render the manufacturer’s recall decision 
inadmissible as evidence at trial and restore proper incentives to recall products and acquire 
information.  See Ben-Shahar (2006) for a discussion of the Vioxx case. 
19  Ben Shahar (1998) explores whether liability should be based on information that wasn’t 
known at the time of sale, focusing on ex ante incentives rather than the post-sale incentives 
considered here.  
20  This  paper  is  also  related  to  the  broader  theoretical  literature  on  information  disclosure.  
Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981) showed that privately-informed parties would tend to 
disclose  favorable  information  to  avoid  adverse  inferences  from  non-disclosure,  leading  to 
unraveling.  In contrast, Verrecchia (1983) found that partial pooling results when disclosure is 
costly.  Parties  with  sufficiently  unfavorable information  pool  together,  suffering  the  average 
adverse inference for the group but saving on disclosure costs.  
21  See also Dye (1985) for a model of partial pooling in the securities context. In Matthews and 
Postlewaite (1985) both acquisition and disclosure are costless. Daughety and Reinganum (1995) 
show that privately informed firms signal their product risks through the prices that they charge.  
Daughety and Reinganum (2008a) and (2008b) explore the firm’s choice between disclosing 
quality directly and signaling quality through the price. 
  7A  potentially  harmful  product  is  produced  and  sold  by  a  manufacturer  with  unit 
production cost c.  The mass of consumers is normalized to 1.  Each consumer uses at most one 
unit of the good.  Consumers are homogeneous at the time of their initial purchase with an 
expected valuation of  , but learn their idiosyncratic valuations for the product following their 
purchase.
0 v
22  A consumer’s gross valuation for the product is v which is drawn from an integrable 
density function g(v) which is positive on the support [, ) v    and zero elsewhere.
23  We make the 
standard assumption that the hazard rate  G(v) g(v) is strictly increasing on [, ) v   .
24  The 
consumer’s net valuation for the product is the gross value less any uncompensated harm or 
injuries associated with the product’s use.  The expected harm associated with a unit of the 
product,  , is drawn from the integrable density  h () f h  on the support [0  with mean  .   
This distribution is assumed to be the same for all buyers and known at the time of sale. 
,)   0 h
Following the production and sale of the product, the consumers privately learn their 
valuations, v, and the manufacturer privately observes the level of per unit harm,  .  In this post-
sale phase, the parties can take actions to mitigate the future losses from product injuries.   A 
consumer can simply stop using the product, foregoing his valuation v.
h
25  The manufacturer can 
issue a post-sale product warning, disclosing the level of future harm,  , to existing consumers.  
It is assumed that disclosures are accurate; the manufacturer cannot understate or overstate the 
accident risks in the product warning.  The manufacturer can also make an offer to repurchase 
the product from consumers for a price p, which is endogenous.
h
26   
                                                 
22 The assumption of ex ante homogeneous consumers with unit demand simplifies the analysis. 
Importantly, there is no ex ante deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.  Polinsky and Shavell’s 
(2006) analysis of disclosure prior to a sale explicitly takes these distortions into account. 
23 The fact that the distribution is unbounded above implies that some consumers should continue 
to use the product for any finite product risk.  The assumption that the distribution is bounded 
below facilitates the characterization of the social welfare benchmark and will be discussed in 
greater detail later. 
24  This assumption will imply that the manufacturer’s profit function is single peaked, giving a 
unique  and  well-behaved  buyback  price.    Many  commonly  known  distributions  satisfy  this 
monotone hazard rate assumption, including the normal distribution and the uniform distribution. 
25 This framework could be extended to allow for durability, where the consumer consumes the 
product both before and after learning his preferences. 
26 There is a small literature on returns policies when consumers learn their valuations after 
purchase.  In Che (1996), returns policies where consumers can return products at the price paid 
may  be  privately  and  socially  desirable  in  order  to  avoid  inefficient  consumption  (when  a 
consumer values the product less than the cost of the product) and to avoid unnecessary risk 
  8The parameter   represents any ex post fixed costs associated with the product recall. 
For  simplicity,  we  will  assume  that  these  fixed  costs  are  the  same  for  recalls  that  involve 
warnings and for those that involve product buybacks.
0   
27  These fixed costs would include the 
costs of identifying and contacting all past purchasers of the product and communicating with 
them about the nature of the problem.  In practice,    would include the direct costs of postage 
and paperwork, the costs of reviewing previous records and registrations, and the transactions 
costs  of  coordinating  with  retailers  and  distributors  (who  may  have  more  direct  access  to 
information about consumers).
28   
We will assume throughout the paper that  000 vc h          , so it is socially efficient for 
the product to be produced and sold even when post-sale warnings are routinely issued  and 
consumers continue to use the dangerous product.  This assumption, together with our earlier 
assumption that consumers are ex ante identical with unit demand, implies that the different 
liability rules all lead to the same ex ante level of sales.  Although the price that the monopolist 
initially charges for the product would differ under the different liability regimes, all consumers 
purchase the product, as they should. 
 
3.  The Social Welfare Benchmark 
 S u p p o s e   t h a t   a   s o c i a l   p l a n n e r   c o u l d   c o n t r o l   the manufacturer’s decision to disclose the 
information about product harms (the “disclosure rule”) and each individual consumer’s decision 
about whether to continue to use the product (the “consumption rule”).  Formally, the disclosure 
rule partitions the different manufacturer types into two groups, one that discloses product harms 
                                                                                                                                                             
(when consumers are risk averse).  In his model, disclosure is irrelevant (because the seller does 
not  learn  anything)  and  the  seller c a n  c o m m i t  t o  t h e  r e t u r n s  p o l i c y  ex  ante.    Without 
commitment, Che’s seller would not take returns.  In our model, the seller has a private ex post 
incentive to buy back the product to avoid liability payments.  Matthews and Persico (2005) 
consider menus of contracts and consumers’ costly acquisition of information. 
27 Although there is no publically available data that documents these costs, the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts states that “the costs of identifying and communicating with product users years 
after sale are often daunting.” (Products Liability §10 comment a.) 
28 In the words of Hal Stratton, the chairman of the CPSC in 2002, “We strive to get zero deaths 
but there are 280 million people out there … We can’t send a letter to 280 million people.  That’s 
cost-prohibitive.” As quoted in Finley (2002a).  Improvements in technology, namely email and 
websites,  may  be  reducing  these  fixed  costs.    There  is  a  general  concern  that  individuals, 
overwhelmed by mass mailings and fine print, fail to absorb the meaning. 
  9to consumers ( ) and the other that remains silent ( D   ND   ).  Given the information disclosed, 
the consumption rule dictates which ex post consumer types will be permitted to use the product 
and which consumers must stop.  
More specifically, suppose that  D h     so the product harm h is disclosed to consumers at 
cost  .  In this case, the social planner’s consumption rule can depend on the true level of harm 
h.    The  optimal  consumption  rule  would  of  course  allow  consumers  with  sufficiently  high 
valuations ( ) to continue to use the product but would require consumers with sufficiently 
low valuations ( ) to discontinue their use.  If 
 
hv  
hv   ND h     , on the other hand, we assume that 
the consumption rule cannot depend on the realized level of harm.  It can, however, depend on 
the average level of harm for this group  )( ND ND hhE h      .
29  When harm is not disclosed, the 
socially optimal consumption rule allows consumers with valuations above the expected harm 
conditional  upon  nondisclosure  ( )  to  continue  to  use  the  product.    Consumers  with 
valuations below this level are required to stop.   
ND hv  
Taking the socially optimal consumption rule as given, social welfare can be written as a 
function of the disclosure rule,   and  D   ND   :  
             (1)  c dh h f dvdh h f v g h v dvdh h f v g h v
D D ND ND h h
                 
   
 
 
 
)( )()() ( )()() (
The first term of equation (1) represents the ex post social surplus associated with the set  ND   .  
When   consumers with valuations   continue to use the product and the social 
surplus for these consumers  .  The second term of equation (1) is the ex post social surplus 
associated with the set  .   When 
ND h    ND hv  
hv  
D   D h      then consumers with valuations   continue to 
use the product (as they should) giving a social surplus of 
hv  
hv   .  The third term is the expected 
fixed cost of disclosure and the final term is the cost of production. 
Lemma 1 establishes that, in general, the socially optimal decision rule could involve 
three regions: a middle region where disclosure does not take place ( ND   ) and a high and a low 
region (together forming   ) where the product risks are disclosed.  This is intuitive.  Suppose  D  
                                                 
29 N o t e  t h a t  B a y e s i a n  c o n s u m e r s  w o u l d  r a t i o nally  form  this  expectation  following  non 
disclosure. 
  10that  .  The optimal consumption rule if harm level  ND hh   ND hh    is disclosed is exactly the 
same as the rule without disclosure – in both cases, the consumer would be permitted to use the 
product if and only if  .  So when  ND hv   ND hh   , the social value of disclosure is zero.  When 
the level of risk h is far from  , however, then disclosure can significantly change consumer 
usage behavior and the social value of disclosure is potentially large. 
ND h
 
Lemma 1: In general, the socially optimal disclosure rule can involve at most two cutoffs ,  )(   h  
and  )(   h ,  where  )( )( 0       hh ,  )] ( ), ( [       hhND  a n d   ) ), ( ( )) ( , 0 [          hh D   .  
Moreover,  0 )] ( ) ( [
0      
   h h Lim . 
 
Proof:   S u p p o s e  t h a t    a n d   ND   D    m a x i m i z e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e .   S u p p o s e  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r v a l  
.  Social welfare would (weakly) fall if this interval were moved from the set  D hh      ] ˆ , ˆ [   D    
into the set  . Using expression (1),   ND  
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Dividing by    and taking the limit as    approaches zero,  
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Dividing by  and rearranging terms, we have   ) ˆ (hf
                             (2)  .) ( ) ˆ () ( ) ˆ (
ˆ
          
   
h h
dv v g v h dv v g v h
ND
Suppose that  .  Then expression (2) becomes  ND hh   ˆ
 
.) ( ) ˆ (
ˆ
      
h
hND
dv v g v h  
This implies that  h cannot be too close to  .  Specifically, there exists a cutoff,  ˆ
ND h ND hh    )( , 
where necessarily  )( ˆ    hh . Moreover, note that  )(   h  converges to   as   approaches zero.  
Now suppose that  .  We can rewrite expression (2) as 
ND h  
ND hh   ˆ
.) ( ) ˆ (
ˆ
      
ND h
h
dv v g h v  
  11This implies that there exists a cutoff,  ND hh    ) ( , where  )( ˆ    hh . Moreover, note that  )(   h  
converges  to   a s    a p p r o a c h e s  z e r o .  T h i s  p r o v e s  t h a t  i f    t h e n   ND h   D hh      ] ˆ , ˆ [  
)) ( ), ( ( ˆ     hh h .  Similarly, one can show that if   then  ND hh      ] ˆ , ˆ [   )] ( ), ( [ ˆ     hh h .             
 
Requiring a manufacturer to pay large sums of money to contact old consumers to notify 
them that the products are unusually safe is not typical in tort law.  In practice, liability may be 
imposed on manufacturers for failing to warn consumers that products are unusually dangerous.  
This fact is not inconsistent with the model.  Analytically, the lowest region described in Lemma 
1 disappears when average harm level,  , is sufficiently small.  When accidents are rare and 
expected harms are low from an ex ante perspective, then there is very little to be gained from 
revealing  that  the  product  is u n u s u a l l y  s a f e .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  a ssumption,  which  we  maintain 
throughout the paper, will guarantee that it is socially desirable to disclose information when the 
product is especially hazardous but not otherwise.   
0 h
 
Assumption 1:    vh   0 . 
 
Assumption 1 tells us that all consumers – even those who like the product the least – still 
value the product more than the ex ante expected harm,  .  This is not unreasonable, especially 
in light of the fact that these consumers presumably valued the product enough to buy it in the 
first place.
0 h
30  More specifically, this assumption implies that there is social value from disclosing 
product risks when the probability of harm is high but not when the probability of harm is low 
and gives us a realistic social welfare benchmark.  
 
Proposition  1:  ( S o c i a l  W e l f a r e  B e n c h m a r k ) .   U n d e r  Assumption  1,  the  socially  optimal 
disclosure rule is characterized by a single cutoff,  )( *   h , implicitly defined by 
       
 ) *(
)(] )(* [
h
v
dv v g v h ,                       (3) 
where   is monotonically increasing in )( *   h   with   vh   )0(*  and      )( *h . 
                                                 
30 In reality, some people dislike products and stop using them shortly after purchasing them and 
never bother to return them.  This paper deliberately abstracts from these types of consumers in 
order to focus instead on the situation where recalls change behavior. 
  12(i)  If   then the harm is not disclosed and all consumers continue to use the product.  )( *    hh
(ii)  If   t h e n  t h e  h a r m  i s  d i s c l o s e d  a n d  o n l y  c o n s u m e r s  w i t h  v a l u a t i o n s    
continue to use the product. 
)( *    hh hv  
 
  The results in Proposition may be understood intuitively (a formal proof is given in the 
Appendix).  Suppose that the expected future harm is exactly at the cutoff, so  vh h       )( * .  
What  is  the  marginal  social  benefit  of  using  this  piece  of  information?    If  the  harm  is  not 
disclosed, then  vh h ND    0  and all consumers will continue to use the product.
31  A group of 
these  consumers  –  namely  the  ones  with  valuations  in  the  interval  )] ( * , [   hv  –  s h o u l d  i n  
principle discontinue using the product.   The marginal social benefit associated with disclosing 
this harm is that these consumers will stop using the product, saving society   vh    )( * .  The 
cutoff   in equation (3) is defined to be the level of harm for which the marginal social 
benefit of disclosing the information to consumers is exactly equal to the marginal social cost of 
disclosing it,  .  
)( *   h
 
When the product risks are very low,  )0(* hvh     , then there is no social value to be 
gained from disclosing h to consumers.  The expected harm is negligible compared to the value 
that the lowest valuation consumer gets from the product.  Therefore there is a range,  ], 0 [ vh   , 
that are never disclosed to consumers in the social welfare benchmark, even when the cost of 
disclosure is arbitrarily small.
32    
 
4.  Liability Rules and Ex Post Behavior 
 
                                                 
31  B y  P r o p o s i t i o n  1 ,   .    By  Assumption  1,  0 hh ND   vh   0 .    Therefore  vh ND    a n d  s o  n o  
consumers will discontinue using the product. 
32 Our assumption that v was bounded away from 0 is of course important for this result.  If 
0   v  a n d    w a s  a r b i t r a r i l y  s m a l l ,  t h e n  t h e  s o c i a lly  optimal  decision  rule  would  involve 
disclosure of both very high and very low harms.  (In the limit, all harms except the point  0 hh    
would be disclosed.)  The social welfare benchmark in this case would be unattainable by all 
realistic liability rules.  An alternative modeling  strategy,  where  0   v  but   is sufficien tly 
bounded away from zero, would yield similar results to those derived here but the restrictions are 
less intuitive.   
 
  13No Manufacturer Liability 
To start, suppose that the consumers are held fully responsible for their own product-
related injuries.  It is clear that the manufacturer has no incentive to initiate a recall.  Since he 
faces no liability for consumer injuries, there is nothing to be privately gained from a warning 
per se and there is no incentive to buy the product back.
33  Consumers know this, of course, but 
believe that the product risks are low on average and continue to use the product.  Note that 
consumers are making the socially correct decisions when they continue to use the product, 
conditional  upon  their  lack  of  information.    The  social  welfare  associated  with  this  regime, 
, is lower than the social welfare benchmark since consumers are unable to restrict 
their usage decisions when the product poses significant hazards. 
0 00      chv
 
Strict Manufacturer Liability 
Now suppose that the manufacturer is forced to bear full responsibility for all product-
related injuries.   Expecting to be fully compensated for their injuries in the future, consumers 
have no intrinsic reason to stop using the product.  They will stop using the product, however, if 
they are compensated to stop.  Consider a consumer with valuation v facing an offer from the 
manufacturer to buy the product back for a price p.  If the consumer keeps the good, he derives 
value v from consumption.  The consumer’s valuation does not depend on the expected harm 
because the consumer is made whole under strict liability – any harm that the consumer suffers 
will be fully compensated.
34   It follows that the consumer would return the product to the 
manufacturer if and only if  .    pv  
The manufacturer receives a private benefit from a product buyback so long as the price 
paid for the return of the product, p, is less than the manufacturer’s expected liability payments 
associated with that unit, h.   The manufacturer chooses the buyback price   to simply minimize 
his expected future payments,  
p
       )] ( 1 [ ) ( p G h p pG Min .                 
                                                 
33  If the manufacturer learned information before selling the product, then the manufacturer 
would have an incentive to disclose that the product was safe in order to extract a higher sale 
price.  See Polinsky and Shavell (2006). 
34 Note that this is true whether or not the consumer knows harm h when considering the return. 
  14The first term represents the buyback payments to those consumers who choose to return the 
product, and the second term represents the expected liability payments to those consumers who 
do not comply with the recall and choose to retain and use the product. The third term is the 
fixed cost of contacting the consumers. Differentiation gives the following first-order condition: 
)( )( ] [
B B B pG pg p h     .                       (4) 
When the manufacturer raises the buyback price slightly the benefit is that it pays   instead of 
h to the marginal consumer who decides to return the product rather than continue to use it.  The 
manufacturer’s marginal benefit is therefore  .  The manufacturer’s marginal cost 
associated with the slightly higher buyback price is that he ends up paying a higher buyback 
price to consumers who would have sold the product back to the manufacturer at the lower price, 
.  The buyback price equates the manufacturer’s marginal benefit with the marginal cost.   
B p
) (] [
B B pg p h  
)(
B pG
 I m p o r t a n t l y ,   o n e   c a n   s e e   t h a t   t h e   b u y b a c k   p r i c e    is typically less than the expected 
unit harm, h.  The manufacturer is a monopsonist, a single buyer with market power when it 
comes to repurchasing its own products in order to avoid liability payouts.  Just as a monopolist 
extracts  profits  from  buyers  by  charging  a  price  above  marginal  cost,  our  monopsonist 
manufacturer extracts rents from past consumers by offering a buyback price that is strictly less 
than the manufacturer’s opportunity cost of not having the product returned, h.   
B p
 
Lemma 2:  When  vh     the manufacturer’s best buyback price (if he chooses to do a buyback), 
, is the implicit solution to equation (4) .  In this range,   is strictly increasing in h 
with 
)( hp
B ) (hp
B
vv p
B   ) (  and   for all  hh p
B   ) ( vh   .  When  vh    the manufacturer cannot benefit from 
a buyback (so  vh p
B   ) (  and no buyers accept). 
 
Proof:  If  vh    then the least a consumer is willing to accept, v, exceeds the manufacturer’s 
maximal willingness to pay, h.   The manufacturer cannot profit from a buyback in this case and 
they will not arise in equilibrium.  If  vh    then the buyback price is implicitly defined by 
equation  (4)  above,  or hp g p G p
B B B     )()( .  W hen  vh   ,  this  equation  is  satisfied  by 
vp
B   .  The monotone hazard rate assumption guarantees that the left hand side is an increasing 
function of  .  Therefore   is increasing in h.                               
B p ) (hp
B
     
  15 W h e n   t h e   e x p e c t e d   l i a b i l i t y  exceeds the valuation of the lowest consumer type,  vh   , the 
manufacturer may find it profitable to pay the fixed cost    to stage a product buyback.  The 
manufacturer would pay a total of    if he offers to buy the 
product back where   is implicitly defined in equation (4).   If the manufacturer does not 
stage a buyback, the consumers will all continue to use the product and the manufacturer will 
pay a total of h. The manufacturer will therefore stage the buyback when  
      ))] ( ( 1 [ )) ( ( ) ( hp G h hp G hp
B B B
) (hp
B
)) ( ( )] ( [ hp Ghph
B B      .                       (5) 
 
Proposition 2:  (Strict Liability with Product Buybacks.)  Suppose that the manufacturer is held 
strictly liable for product injuries and can initiate a product buyback.  There exists a cutoff, 
, implicitly defined by:  )(  
B h
          ))) ( ( ( ))] ( ( ) ( [
BB BB B hp G hp h ,                   (6) 
where   is an increasing function of  ) ( 
B h   with   vh
B   )0(.  
(i)  If   then there is no buyback and all consumers continue to use the product.    ) (  
B hh
(ii)  If   then the manufacturer offers to buy the product back for   implicitly 
defined in (4) and consumers continue to use the product when  . 
) (  
B hh ) (hp
B
) (hpv
B  
 
Proof:   Combining expressions (4) and (5), the manufacturer will stage a buyback when  
)). ( ( )) ( (
)) ( (
)) ( (
)) ( ( )] ( [ hp hp G
hp g
hp G
hp Ghph
B B
B
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Let   be the level of harm that satisfies this expression with equality, or   ) ( 
B h
))). ( ( (       
BB hp  
 Totally differentiating this expression and rearranging terms,  
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The derivative of   is positive because we assumed that the hazard rate,  ) (
B p   )( )( vg vG , was 
monotone and the cumulative distribution function, G(v) is of course monotone as well.  The 
derivative  of     is a lso positiv e by Lemma 2.  Theref ore we have th at   is an  
increasing function as well.  When 
) (
BB hp ) ( 
B h
0      the manufacturer will stage a buyback for all  vh    
and, from the previous lemma,  vv p
B   ) ( . We have  vh
B   )0( .                          
 
  16We will now prove that the private benefit to the manufacturer of staging a buyback is 
smaller than the social benefit when  vh   .  The manufacturer’s private benefit from the buyback 
is    T h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r  s a v e s    w h e n  a  c o n s u m e r  r e t u r n s  t h e  
product, and the volume of returns is    We can write this private benefit as: 
)). ( ( )] ( [ hp Ghph
B B   ) (hph
B  
)). (( hp G
B
. ) ( )] ( [
)(
   
hp
v
B
B
dv v g h p h                         (7) 
We  will  use  this  expression  in  a  moment.    There  is  an  important  externality  at  play:  the 
manufacturer doesn’t take consumer surplus into account when thinking about his private benefit 
of a buyback.  A consumer with valuation   who returns the product gains consumer 
surplus of  .  The social gain from a buyback is the sum of producer and consumer 
surplus,  .    Aggregated  over  all  consumers  who  return  the 
product, the social benefit of the product buyback is  
) (hpv
B  
vh p
B   ) (
vh v hp hph
B B          ) ) ( ( )) ( (
.) ( ) (
)(
   
hp
v
B
dv v g v h                          (8) 
The social benefit of a product recall would be even higher if consumers with valuations between 
 and h stopped using the product.  This does not happen because the firm is a monopsonist 
and so   for all 
)( hp
B
hh p
B   ) ( vh    (by Lemma 2).  
 
Proposition 3:  (Strict Liability with Product Buybacks.)  The manufacturer selects a buyback 
price that is too low and initiates a buyback too infrequently. 
 
The decentralized market outcome with strict liability d ive rges from  socially optim al 
behavior in two important respects.  First, when buybacks are offered there are some consumers 
who continue to use the product even though it would be socially desirable for them to stop.  
This  latter  distortion  arises  because  the  buyback  price  is  smaller  than  the  expected  harm, 
.    If  instead  the  manufacturer  were  to  set  the  buyback p r i c e  e q u a l  t o  
,  the  consumers  would  make  the  socially  correct  usage  decision.    Second,  the 
manufacturer’s private incentive to engage in a buyback is too small.  The reason is simple:  
consumers benefit from the buyback ex post (since they have the option to return or keep the 
hh ph p
B    )( * )(
hh p   )( *
  17product) and the manufacturer does not internalize the increase in consumer surplus that results 
from the buyback.
35  If a social planner fully controlled the recall process, he would contact 
consumers when   and offer to buy the product back for    and the social 
welfare benchmark from Proposition 1 would be obtained.   
)( *    hh hh p   )( *
 
                                                 
35 These ideas are familiar from the standard monopoly problem. There, a monopolist charges 
too high a price and fails to capture the consumer surplus.  Consequently, a monopolist may 
decline to sink fixed costs of entry even when entry is socially efficient. 
  18The Post-Sale Duty to Warn 
Suppose that the court is well informed about the distribution of product harms and the 
nature of demand, and can design a liability rule that is sensitive to the manufacturer’s realized 
information about harm,  h.
36  If the court could accurately observe h ex post, then the court 
could  implement  the  social  welfare  benchmark  with  a  “duty  to  warn”  requirement  with  a 
negligence  standard   d e f i n e d  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  b e n c h m a r k  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 ) .   T h e  
manufacturer would not be held liable for product-related injuries if he discloses information to 
consumers (issues a post-sale warning).  The manufacturer will be held liable, however, if he 
fails to warn consumers of the risks and, in addition, the court determines that   (so a 
warning is cost-justified).   
*( ) h  
*( ) hh   
It is not hard to see why this rule leads to the socially correct consumer and producer 
behaviors.  A consumer, believing that the manufacturer has complied with the standard, bears 
the  full  brunt  of  his  own  product-related  injuries  and  therefore  makes  the  socially  correct 
consumption decision.  This rule also gives the manufacturer the incentive to comply with the 
standard.  Suppose that the manufacturer observes that the level of risk is just slightly above 
, the duty-to-warn standard.  The manufacturer prefers to disclose the risk to consumers 
rather than remain silent because his expected liability payments from non-disclosure are larger 
than the cost of disclosure,   (from Proposition 1).  It follows that the manufacturer 
will comply with the standard when 
*( ) h  
*( ) h     
*( ) hh      and will also comply with the standard when 
 since the manufacturer’s liability from not disclosing is increasing with his true type, 
, but his costs remain fixed at  . 
*( ) hh   
h  
 
Proposition 4:  (The Duty to Warn.)  Consider the socially optimal threshold for disclosure, 
,  defined  in  Proposition  1.    A  negligence  rule  that  imposes  a  duty  to  warn  on  the 
manufacturer when the product risk is above the threshold,  ,  but no such duty when 
the product risk is below the threshold,  
*( ) h  
*( ) hh   
*( ) hh     , implements the social welfare benchmark.   
 
                                                 
36  The court can potentially infer this harm level ex post by observing the prevalence and the 
magnitude of consumer injuries.  If the manufacturer had private information about the aggregate 
probability  of  harm,  however,  then  the  realized h a r m s  a r e  a  v e r y  i m p e r f e c t  i n d i c a t o r  o f  t h e  
information held by the manufacturer in the post-sale phase. 
  19The post-sale duty to warn might be difficult to implement in practice for several reasons.  
First,  it  would  require  the  court  to  determine  “reasonable”  behavior  on  the  part  of  the 
manufacturer.  In order to calculate  *( ) h    the court would need to know the characteristics of 
consumer demand, g(v), the cost of disclosure,  , and the manufacturer’s ex post observation of 
the parameter  .  While some of these parameters may be roughly observable to a court, others 
would require a significant degree of expertise.  Indeed, even managers of firms with direct 
knowledge  and  experience  with  the  operations  of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f t e n  f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
quantify these factors.  In practice, the court would need to rely on the evidence elicited through 
pretrial discovery and litigation, mechanisms that are imperfect.     
h
 
Social Welfare Comparison 
  The next result follows immediately from the preceding analysis. 
 
Proposition 5:  (Comparison of Liability Regimes.)  For any positive cost of disclosure,  0     ,  
the  post-sale  duty  to  warn  achieves  higher  social  welfare  than  strict  liability  with  product 
buybacks, which in turn achieves higher social welfare than having no liability at all.   
 
5.  Liability Rules and Ex Ante Investments in Product Safety 
 U p   u n t i l   t h i s   p o i n t ,   w e   h a v e   a b s t r a c t e d   a w a y   f r o m   i m p o r t a n t   ex ante issues in order to 
focus on the post-sale behavior of firms.  In practice, liability rules will affect the prices that 
manufacturers can command for their products in the marketplace and their incentives to design 
safer products.  While some hazards are beyond the control of manufacturers at the product 
design  stage,  other  risks  can  be  reduced  through  greater  investments  and  precautions.  
Pharmaceutical companies, for example, invest in clinical testing before releasing drugs on the 
general market.  Similarly, automobile manufacturers invest in crash testing their vehicles and 
other safety-related investigations.  This section extends the analysis to explore the effect of 
liability rules on ex ante pricing and investment levels. 
 S u p p o s e   t h a t   b e f o r e   s e l l i n g   t h e   p r o d u c t   on  the  market,  the  manufacturer  can  invest 
resources   to reduce the probability,  0   e )( e   , that the product will be dangerous and cause 
harm  .  With probability  )( ~ hf h )( 1 e      the product will be perfectly safe and will cause no 
  20harm at all,  . 0   h
37  We will make the following assumptions to guarantee a nicely-behaved 
interior solution:  0) (     e   ,  0) (      e   ,         )0(   , and  0) (    
  
e Lim
e
  .  We assume further that 
these  investments,  e,  are  fully  observable  by  consumers  at  the  time  of  purchase.    (This 
assumption will be discussed in greater detail later.)  Since the manufacturer is a monopolist, and 
consumers are ex ante homogeneous with unit demand, the manufacturer can and will extract all 
expected  consumer  surplus  through  the  sale  price.    As  a  consequence,  the  manufacturer’s 
incentives at the ex ante stage to take precautions and invest in safety features are aligned with 
the interests of society more broadly. 
 
No Manufacturer Liability 
 S u p p o s e   t h a t   t h e   m a n u f a c t u r e r   b e a r s   n o   ex  post r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  p r o d u c t  i n j u r i e s .    
Although the manufacturer has no incentive to stage recalls or warn consumers about product 
risks ex post, he does have an incentive to invest in product safety ex ante.  Since consumers 
expect to bear the losses associated with accidents, consumers are willing to pay a premium for 
safer products.  Formally, a consumer’s willingness to pay for a product with safety investments 
e is  0 0 )( he v     .  The manufacturer, as a monopolist, will extract this value through the price:  
0 0 )( )( he v e P
NL      . 
The manufacturer’s costs include only the production costs and investments in safety.  Since the 
manufacturer’s mass of customers is normalized to 1, the total costs are 
    ec e C
NL    ) (.
The manufacturer’s profits as a function of investment e are  
  .                 (9)  0 0 )( )( )( )( he e c v e C e P e
NL NL NL              
The manufacturer invests to the point where the marginal benefit of reduced expected accident 
harms is exactly equal to the marginal cost,    
1) ( 0       he
NL   .                       (10) 
 
                                                 
37 Formally, this is giving us a parameterization where distribution of harm with a mass point at  
h = 0 where the weight of that mass point is rising in the level of effort, e.   
  21Strict Manufacturer Liability 
 W i t h   s t r i c t   l i a b i l i t y ,   a   c o n s u m e r ’ s   willingness  to  pay  will  actually  exceed  .    A 
consumer with valuation v who continues to use the product will receive an ex post payoff of v.  
This is true whether or not there is an accident, since the consumer will be made whole through 
the liability system.  If the product turns out to be sufficiently dangerous, however, then the 
manufacturer  will  offer  to  buy  the  product  back  for  .    Consumers  with  valuations 
 will return their products, thereby receiving a payoff that is higher than the gross 
valuation v.  The manufacturer’s price reflects the consumer’s expected future rents:  
0 v
) (hp
B
)( hpv
B  
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hp
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B SL dvdh h f v g v h p e v e P   .              (11) 
The  second  term,  which  is  positive,  is  the  expected  consumer  surplus  associated  with 
manufacturer  buyouts.    Intuitively,  the  consumer  derives  a  benefit  above  and  beyond  their 
valuation, v, when   and the manufacturer offers to buy the product back for a price 
.  Note  that  the  price  in  equation  (11)  is  falling  in  the  manufacturer’s  safety 
investments, e.  That is, consumers pay less for products that are safer and more for products that 
are more dangerous.   The manufacturer’s total expected cost under strict liability is: 
) (  
B hh
vh p
B   ) (
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B SL dh h f dv v g h p h e h e e c e C    .         (12) 
This may be understood intuitively.  If product buybacks were infeasible, the manufacturer’s 
costs would be  0 )( he e c      . When buybacks are feasible, however, the manufacturer enjoys 
some additional costs savings, captured by the last term in (12).  Combining (11) and (12), the 
manufacturer’s expected profits may be written as: 
  ,             (13)  ) )( ( )( )( )( 0 0
SL SL SL SL Bh e e c v eCe Pe                 
where  
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  22is the ex post social value from manufacturer-initiated buybacks.
38  The manufacturer will invest 
in safety precautions to the point where the marginal benefit of additional precautions equals the 
marginal cost, 
                       (15)  . 1 ) )( ( 0       
SL SL Bhe  
 
The Post-Sale Duty to Warn 
 N o w   s u p p o s e   t h a t   t h e   c o u r t s   c a n   i m p l e m e n t   t h e   p o s t - s a l e   d u t y   t o   w a r n .     A s   d e s c r i b e d  
earlier,  this  liability  rule  achieves  the  social w e l f a r e  b e n c h m a r k .   T h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r  w a r n s  
consumers when   and consumers make the appropriate usage decision and bear the 
harms from accidents.  Given a level of investment e, the manufacturer can charge a price of: 
)( *    hh
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0 0 )()(] [ )( )( )( *
h
h
v
dvdh h f v g v h e h e v e P    .             (16) 
The  last  term  is  the  value  the  consumer  places  on  receiving  future  warnings  from  the 
manufacturer.  When warned of harm h, consumers with valuations in the interval  ],[ hv  stop 
using the product.  Although the manufacturer avoids liability for the product-related harms, the 
manufacturer does bear the fixed costs of issuing warnings.  The manufacturer’s total cost is: 
  .                   (17)   
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)( )( )(*
h
dh h f e e c e C  
Taken together, the manufacturer’s profits are 
  *) )( ( )(* )(* )(* 0 0 Bh e e c v e CeVe                 ,              (18) 
where  
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dh h f dv v g v h B                   (19) 
is the social value generated by the post-sale duty to warn.  The manufacturer will invest in 
safety precautions up to the point where  
 1 *) *)( ( 0        Bh e   .                      (20) 
 
                                                 
38 Recall that buybacks are socially valuable because  vh    is avoided when consumers with 
values   return their products to the manufacturer.    hh p v
B    ) (
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 G i v e n   t h e   p r e c e d i n g   c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s ,   i t   i s   s t raightforward to rank the three regimes in 
terms  of  product  safety  investments  and  the  manufacturer’s  profits.    The  social  welfare  is 
identical to the manufacturer’s profits since investments are observable to consumers and the 
manufacturer fully extracts consumer surplus ex ante through the sale price. 
 
Proposition 6:      and  .  * eee
SL NL    *) (* ) ( ) ( e e e
SL SL NL NL        
 
 A t   f i r s t   g l a n c e ,   i t   m a y   b e   s u r p r i s i n g   t h a t   a  regime  of  no  liability  leads  to  greater 
investments  in  safety  than  the  other  regimes.  T h i s  a r i s e s  b e c a u s e  c o n s u m e r s  d e m a n d  s a f e r  
products ex ante, since they anticipate (rationally) that they will never be warned when products 
are dangerous ex post and therefore will suffer greater ex post harms.  The manufacturer’s greater 
ex ante investments in product safety serve as a substitute for ex post warnings and buybacks.  
When  there  is  a  post-sale  duty  to  warn,  consumers  can  rest  assured  that  they  will  be 
appropriately notified ex post that products are dangerous.  This implies that consumers place a 
smaller premium on safer products ex ante, and so the manufacturer invests less in safety. 
 T h e   p o s t - s a l e   d u t y   t o   w a r n   l e a d s   t o   t h e   h i ghest possible social welfare, followed by the 
regime  of  strict  liability,  followed  by  no  manufacturer  liability  at  all.    Formally,  the 
manufacturer’s  profits  or  (equivalently)  social  welfare    are    the  maximized  value  of 
 w h e r e   ) )( ( )( 0 0
j j Bh e e c v e              NL SL j , *,    i s  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  r e g i m e .  S i n c e  t h e  
constants   w e  c a n  a p p l y  t h e  e n v e l o p e  theorem  to  verify  that  
.  It is not surprising the post-sale duty to warn performs so well.  
We established earlier that this rule leads to the socially optimal ex post disclosure decision for 
the manufacturer and socially optimal decision rule for the consumers.  Furthermore, since the 
manufacturer  fully  extracts  consumer  surplus  at  the  ex  ante s t a g e ,  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r ’ s  
investments in product safety are socially optimal as well.   It bears repeating, however, that the 
information demands on the court may well prevent the accurate implementation of this rule in 
practice.  Strict liability, while not achieving the social welfare benchmark, may be a viable 
second-best solution. 
0*   
SL BB
) ( ) ( *) ( *
NL NL SL SL e ee        
 
  24Discussion 
 T h i s   a n a l y s i s   i n   t h i s   s e c t i o n   r e l i e d   o n   t h e   a s s u m p t i o n   t h a t   s a f e t y   i n v e s t m e n t s ,   e, were 
perfectly observable to consumers at the time of the original sale.  Our results would still hold if 
e were privately observed by the manufacturer, assuming that it could be costlessly and credibly 
disclosed to consumers. Suppose that there is no manufacturer liability.  As described above, the 
price that consumers are willing to pay is increasing in their beliefs about product safety.  A 
manufacturer  who  has  sunk  costs  to  create  a  very  safe  product  would  have  an  incentive  to 
disclose  that  information  to  consumers,  thereby  receiving  a  higher  price.    The  negative 
inferences  made  by  consumers  when  the  manufacturer  is  silent  would  put  pressure  on  the 
manufacturers of less safe products to disclose the product’s harm as well.  In the absence of 
manufacturer liability, all of the information would come to light and the manufacturer’s price 
would  perfectly  reveal  the  harm  to  consumers.   T h i s  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  the  traditional  unravel 
argument  (see Grossman, 1981; Verrechia, 1983; Shavell, 1994; Polinsky and Shavell, 2006).
39     
 T h i s   d i s c u s s i o n   h i g h l i g h t s   a   f u n d a m e n t a l   difference between information known by the 
manufacturer at the time of a sale and information that is only discovered later after the product 
has been sold.  Even in the absence of liability, the economic incentives created by the market 
encourage the manufacturer to disclose information prior to a sale.
40  When harms are discovered 
by the manufacturer only after the product has been sold, however, these fundamental market 
incentives are missing.  When product risks are discovered only after the sale of the product, 
manufacturer liability is necessary to create incentives for disclosure. 
 U n r a v e l i n g   a r g u m e n t s   a l s o   a p p l y   w h e n   t h e   m a nufacturer is held strictly liable for product 
related injuries, although (interestingly) the logic of unraveling goes in the opposite direction.  
With strict liability, consumers are willing to pay more for unsafe products.  Consumers are 
made whole ex post, and may do even better than that when the manufacturer initiates a buyback.   
A manufacturer who has created a very unsafe product therefore has an incentive to disclose that 
fact to consumers ex ante, thereby securing a higher price.  The consumers would interpret 
silence on the part of the manufacturer as reflecting higher levels of product safety.  This leads 
                                                 
39 A similar argument can be made for the post sale duty to warn since consumers directly value 
safer products in that regime as well. 
40   Full disclosure may be compromised by a variety of factors.  Disclosure costs, for example, 
can lead to partial pooling outcomes. See Polinsky and Shavell (2006). 
  25manufacturers with somewhat higher levels of safety investments to disclose as well.  In the end, 
if disclosure is costless then all information is revealed and our previous results obtain.   
 O u r   a n a l y s i s   w o u l d   s u r e l y   c h a n g e   i f   i n v e s t ments in product safety could not be credibly 
disclosed to consumers at the time of the sale.
41  In this case, the post-sale duty to warn provides 
at best weak incentives for product safety.  The social cost of a harmful product includes both the 
harms to the consumer, , and the costs to the manufacturer of staging the recall,  .  Under the 
post-sale duty to warn, the manufacturer bears the latter cost ex post but not the former (since 
liability is averted when the manufacturer discloses information to consumers).  This suggests 
that the manufacturer may take suboptimal precautions to reduce the incidence of harm at the ex 
ante stage.  Strict liability may provide better incentives than the post-sale duty to warn in this 
case.  Product buybacks are ex post costly for the manufacturer (since they pay both the fixed 
costs,  , and a price to consumers to return the product) and this creates an incentive to design 
safer products to begin with.  It should be made clear, however, that strict liability falls short of 
full social efficiency.  The improved ex ante deterrence is coupled with the very same ex post 
distortions identified earlier. 
h  
 
If society is concerned that manufacturers are investing too little in precautions to reduce 
the  future  harms  caused  by  their  products,  then  it  would  make  sense  to  adopt  additional 
instruments to encourage these investments.  Regulations that mandate product testing (as in the 
automobile and pharmaceutical industries) or negligence rules for ex ante care levels would be 
valuable supplements to the post-sale duties analyzed in this paper.  A full formal analysis of 
privately observed safety measures is beyond the scope of this manuscript. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper considered the problem of encouraging manufacturers to adequately warn 
consumers of product dangers, while at the same time encouraging consumers to make prudent 
decisions about continuing to use dangerous products.  Under a regime of strict liability, the 
manufacturer may find it profitable to contact consumers and offer to repurchase the product.  By 
                                                 
41  The analysis would be more subtle if there were downward sloping demand.  There, the 
manufacturer’s ex post costs would effect the monopoly price.  Consequently, the price charged 
by the monopolist would be a signal of product safety.  See Daughety and Reinganum’s (1995) 
analysis of liability and price signaling and Daughety and Reinganum (2008a) and (2008b) on 
the choice between signaling and disclosure when there are disclosure costs.  
  26doing  so,  the  manufacturer  can  avoid  the  future  liability  associated  with  product  injuries.  
Although this regime performs better than having no liability at all, the private incentives of the 
manufacturer fall short of the social welfare benchmark.  The manufacturer does not internalize 
the surplus that his buyback creates for consumers, and therefore does not stage a recall often 
enough and makes a buyback offer that is too low.  A negligence-based duty to warn, where the 
manufacturer is held liable if and only if he fails to take cost-justified measures, achieves the 
social welfare benchmark but may be difficult to implement.   The effects on ex ante pricing and 
safety investments were also explored. 
Future research on this topic might explore the efficacy of other legal instruments as well.  
Punitive damages – a key issue in the lawsuits brought against Merck for their painkiller Vioxx – 
have the potential to be helpful in certain circumstances.
42  Suppose that there is a post-sale duty 
to warn, but detection is imperfect and so the manufacturer may succeed in avoiding liability 
when he fails to warn consumers. In this case, punitive damages can restore the manufacturer’s 
incentives to comply with the negligence standard. In a similar vein, a damage multiplier can 
help to raise a manufacturer’s incentives to initiate a product recall under strict liability.  This 
may be valuable when plaintiffs have a difficult time establishing a link between their injuries 
and the manufacturer’s product, or when plaintiffs have an otherwise insufficient incentive to 
bring their claims.
43  Alternatively, the rule of strict liability might be augmented with a warning 
defense, where manufacturers can avoid liability for product harms by disclosing the products 
risks ex post.
44  This rule has the advantage that consumers, once warned, bear the costs of 
accidents and therefore have the incentive to discontinue product use when the harm exceeds 
their private benefit.  On the downside, a warning defense could lead the manufacturer to contact 
                                                 
42 Punitive damages may be awarded in cases involving gross negligence and willful misconduct.  
In recent Vioxx litigation against Merck, a punitive damages award by a lower court was struck 
down on appeal (Berenson, 2008).  
43 See Shavell (2004) for a discussion of punitive damages in law. A damage multiplier would 
not, however, lead the manufacturer to choose  an  appropriate  buyback  price.    Although  the 
benefit to the manufacturer of removing the product from use is higher, suggesting that the 
buyback price will rise, the consumers will demand correspondingly higher prices to compensate 
them for the foregone opportunity to sue. 
44 I n  p r a c t i c e ,  i s s u i n g  w a r n i n g s  a n d  s t a g i n g  r e c a l l s  c a n  a l s o  p r o t e c t  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  a g a i n s t  
punitive damages claims.  Jewel Companies, Inc. , for example, “avoided a punitive damages 
award because of the remedial actions it took after receiving notice of a salmonella outbreak, 
instituting an immediate recall program, hiring a private lab to inspect its plants and test its 
products, …” Ross (2004, p. 85). 
  27consumers too frequently.
45  Finally, one might argue that regulatory agencies could be given 
greater latitude to influence recall decisions and buyback prices.  
This paper abstracted from the effect of product recalls on the future sales and activities 
of manufacturers.  When products are long-lived and the quality of products is correlated over 
time, the decision of a manufacturer to recall a product can have the long run effect of chilling 
demand  for  the  manufacturer’s  product  and  potentially  encouraging  additional  lawsuits  that 
otherwise would not have been brought (as in Ben-Shahar, 2005).  It would be interesting to 
model these future reputational concerns in addition to the corrective benefits of product recalls 
considered  here.    Another  important  issue  is  the  manufacturer’s  decision  to  repair  existing 
dangerous  products  or  to  replace  them  with  new  products  rather  than  to  simply  repurchase 
them.
46   These issues are beyond the scope of the current manuscript and left for future research. 
                                                 
45  An analysis of this regime as included in a previous working paper version of this paper 
available from the author upon request. 
46  Hua (2009) considers a model of product recalls where the manufacturer learns about the 
probability of harm following the sale of the product, and consumers learn about the magnitude 
of the harm.  He considers different rules governing the consumers’ duty to return the product to 
the manufacturer and their effect on the manufacturer’s incentives to fix or replace the product. 
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Proof of Proposition 1:   Using the expression for social welfare in (1) and the results in Lemma 
1, the values  ,  ND h h, and h maximize,  
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subject to the constraint that  hh    0 .  Differentiating with respect to   and setting the 
expression equal to zero verifies that 
ND h
]) , [ ( hh hhE h ND    .   Differentiating with respect to  h 
and dividing by )( hf , 
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This expression is weakly decreasing in h.  Evaluating it at  0   h  gives 
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This first inequality follows from the fact that  0 )( hh h h E h ND       and the second equality 
follows from Assumption 1.  Moreover, since it is strictly smaller than   when  0 0   h , then it 
must be strictly smaller than   for all  0 0   h .  Therefore we have a corner solution,  0   h .   The 
first-order condition for h is 
      
h
hND
dv v g v h )() ( .               
 Since  vh   0  b y  A s s u m p t i o n  1 ,  w e  k n o w  t h a t   vh h ND     0  a n d  s o  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  b e c o m e s  
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